Phenomenology

Intentionality and the early stages of phenomenology


Phenomenology begins with Husserl who was the core figure in the development of phenomenology as a modern movement. It is important, however, to trace the earlier history of phenomenology in the influence of Franz Brentano (1838–1917) on the work of Husserl. Brentano was part of the preparatory phase of this movement (Cohen et al., 2000).


One of the main themes of phenomenology is the concept of intentionality. Husserl takes this term from Brentano though he does not use it in the same way. Giorgi (1997: 237) describes the notion of intentionality as Husserl sees it. In Husserl’s work, intentionality is ‘the essential feature of consciousness’ which is directed towards an object. When human beings are conscious, they are always conscious of something. Consciousness in phenomenology relates to the person’s consciousness of the world (Langridge, 2007)


This critical statement concerning the notion of intentionality shows the complexity of any attempt to define the act of conscious thought. In the human sciences, according to Giorgi, consciousness overcomes the dilemma of the subject–object debate, the mind–body relationship which is understood holistically and structurally. Philosophers, psychologists and natural scientists, including doctors and psychiatrists, neither agree nor have firmly established what exactly consciousness is, or what is the true relationship between mind and body. The ideas presented in this chapter cannot resolve the mind–body problem. However, it is useful to note that phenomenology is, in fact, one approach that attempts to do this. Priest places phenomenology within mind–body theories arising from the following:



  • Descartes’ dualism which separates mind and body.
  • So called logical behaviourism: this is a belief that everything concerns behaviour.
  • Notions of idealism: all that exists can be explained in terms of the mind.
  • Materialism: everything in the universe can be explained in terms of matter.
  • Functionalism: everything is a kind of cause and effect. The mind is given a stimulus and responds physically or behaviourally.
  • So-called ‘double aspect theory’: the physical and mental are, in fact, merely aspects of something else, another reality, outside notions of the mental and the physical.
  • The phenomenological view: this is an attempt to describe lived experiences, without making previous assumptions about the objective reality of those experiences.

Whilst these ideas are presented as theories within philosophy, phenomenology is, in fact, also a practice. It is this practice that is so exciting for nursing, health and social care alike, because it offers the possibility of ‘ … characterizing the contents of experience just as they appear to consciousness with a view to capturing their essential features’ (Priest, 1991: 183).


Phases and history of the movement


As has already been stated, phenomenology has philosophical origins. In 1960, the first edition of Spiegelberg’s review of the history of the phenomenological movement was published. He described what he termed three phases in the movement, the preparatory, the German and the French phases. Cohen (1987) summarises these in a paper giving her account of the history and importance of phenomenological research for nursing and stated that Brentano influenced this preparatory phase.


The German phase


The German phase involved primarily Husserl and later Heidegger. Cohen et al. (2000) discuss Husserl’s contribution to the movement and highlight his centrality for phenomenology, his search for rigour, his criticism of positivism (all knowledge is derived from the senses – linked to scientific inquiry of observation and experiment) and his concepts of Anschauung (phenomenological intuition) and phenomenological reduction. In the former, a different kind of experience is apparent, closely involved with the imagination. Experience suggests a relationship with something real, such as an event, while Anschauung can also occur in imagination or memory. The latter is a process to suspend attitudes, beliefs and suppositions in order to properly examine what is present. Husserl termed this part of phenomenological reduction epoché (from the Greek, meaning ‘suspension of belief). Bracketing (a mathematical term) is the name given by Husserl to this process of suspending beliefs and prior assumptions about a phenomenon. Bracketing and phenomenological reduction are important features of the method, the actual ‘doing’ of phenomenology. The complex approach of various forms of phenomenology and the idea of bracketing in Husserl’s and Heidegger’s work has been debated in many books and articles explaining phenomenology to and for nurses both by well-known and new researchers, such as, for instance, Jasper (1994), Crotty (1996), Paley (1997), Berg et al. (2006), Streubert Speziale and Rinaldi Carpenter (2007).


Husserl’s major contribution to phenomenology consisted of three elements in particular: intentionality, essences and phenomenological reduction (bracketing).


Several important elements of phenomenology were developed by colleagues and students of Husserl. The major concepts are intersubjectivity and the idea of ‘lifeworld’ (Lebenswelt). Intersubjectivity is about the existence of a number of subjectivities which are shared by a community, that is, by individual persons who share a common world. The intersubjective world is accessible because humans have empathy for others. The way of making sense of experience is essentially intersubjective (Schwandt, 2007).


The concept of lifeworld (Lebenswelt) is about the lived experience that is central to modern phenomenology. Human beings do not often take into account the commonplace and ordinary; indeed, they do not even notice it. Phenomenological inquiry is the approach needed to help examine and recognise the lived experience that is commonly taken for granted.


The next stage in the German phase of phenomenology involved Heidegger who was an assistant to Husserl for a while. Due to the upsurge of interest (particularly in North America) in using the phenomenological framework for nursing and midwifery research, Heidegger is often mentioned in the work of a number of health researchers over the years. Benner’s (1984) phenomenological research uncovered excellence and power in clinical nursing practice, and she references, amongst others, Heidegger. Her well-known study had a profound influence, particularly on nursing research. Heidegger’s changed direction from Husserlian phenomenology and his break with it occurred in the way he developed the notion of Dasein which is explained fully in his work Being and Time in 1927 and translated into English in 1962. Heidegger’s concern was to ask questions about the nature of being and about temporality (being is temporal). In this sense, he was interested in ontological ideas. Heidegger’s notion of Dasein is an explanation of the nature of being and existence and, as such, a concept of personhood. Leonard (1994) makes five main points concerning a Heideggerian phenomenological view of the person. These are as follows.



1. The person has a world, which comes from culture, history and language. Often this world is so inclusive that it is overlooked and taken for granted until we reflect and analyse.


2. The person has a being in which things have value and significance. In this sense, persons can only be understood by a study of the context of their lives.


3. The person is self-interpreting. A person has the ability to make interpretations about knowledge. The understanding gained becomes part of the self.


4. The person is embodied. This is a different view from the Cartesian, which is about possessing a body. The notion of embodiment is the view that the body is the way we can potentially experience the action of ourselves in the world.


5. The person ‘is’ in time. This requires a little more elaboration as outlined below.

Heidegger had a different notion from the one of traditional time, which is perceived to flow in a linear fashion, with an awareness of ‘now’. According to Leonard (1994) he used the word ‘temporality’ which denotes a new way of perceiving time in terms of including the now, the no longer and the not yet.


As well as these ideas, Heidegger developed phenomenology into interpretive philosophy that became the basis for hermeneutical methods of inquiry (in classical Greek mythology Hermes was the transmitter of the messages from the Gods to the mortals). This often involved interpreting the messages for the recipients to aid understanding. Hermeneutics developed as a result of translating literature from different languages, or where direct access to authoritative texts, such as the Bible, was difficult. Hermeneutics became the theory of interpretation and developed into its present form as the theory of the interpretation of meaning. Text means language. Gadamer (1975) suggests that human beings’ experience of the world is connected with language.


Linking the ideas of hermeneutics with phenomenology, Koch (1995: 831) states:


‘Heidegger (1962) declares nothing can be encountered without reference to the person’s background understanding, and every encounter entails an interpretation based on the person’s background, in its ‘historicality’. The framework of interpretation that we use is the foreconception in which we grasp something in advance.’


Heidegger’s goes beyond mere description to interpretation. Heideggerian interpretive phenomenology is a popular research approach in nursing. This form of research explores the meaning of being a person in the world. Rather than suspending presuppositions, researchers examine them and make them explicit.


The French phase


Cohen (1987) argues that Heidegger’s major contribution to the phenomeno-logical movement was his influence on French philosophy. She points out that the main figures in this phase were Gabriel Marcel (1889–1973), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961). Marcel did not call himself a phenomenologist but viewed phenomenology as an introduction to analysing the notion of being.


Jean-Paul Sartre was the most influential figure in the movement but again did not want the label phenomenologist; rather he was termed as an existentialist. Phenomenological concepts and terms are difficult to grasp and it is often difficult to find a starting point. Understanding of terminology can be obviously further enhanced in progression from general to specific.


The idea of existence and essence are from Sartre; his famous and often quoted phrase is ‘existence precedes essence’. This is Sartre’s idea that a person’s actual consciousness and behaviour (existence) comes before character (essence) (Cohen, 1987). In this sense, research would focus on real and concrete thoughts and behaviour before imaginary or idealised qualities or essences. The notion of intentionality features also in Sartre’s work.


Merleau-Ponty’s interest in phenomenology focused on perception and the creation of a science of human beings (for the purpose of this chapter it is not necessary to develop this further).


Another major figure in French phenomenology is Paul Ricoeur. Spiegelberg (1984) argues that Ricoeur’s phenomenology is primarily descriptive and based on a Husserlian eidetic concern with essential structures. Ricoeur, like Gadamer, focuses on the intersubjective and on issues of language and communication.


There are then different approaches within phenomenology. Indeed most researchers acknowledge that phenomenology is not a single and integrated philosophical direction. In the next stage of this chapter, we will examine the schools of phenomenology outlined by Cohen and Omery (1994).


Schools of phenomenology


It has been shown thus far that phenomenology is an approach within continental philosophy. For purposes of qualitative research however, phenomenology has also been adapted and used as a framework within the so-called interpretive tradition that broadly includes grounded theory and ethnography as Lowenberg (1993) points out. She states: ‘Basic to all these approaches is the recognition of the interpretive and constitutive cognitive processes inherent in all social life’ (p. 58) and shows that there are many ‘quandaries in terminology’ which lead to misinterpretations in the nursing and education research literature, and sometimes in social research. She argues that there is a problem with phenomenology, the distinctions between the assumptions that lie behind the theories (e.g. Husserl and Heidegger) and the actual method, the ‘doing’ of phenomenology. Part of the purpose of this chapter is to try to unravel these perplexities.


A useful outline of phenomenological philosophy, guiding research and describing the development of schools with different approaches, is presented by Cohen and Omery (1994). The broad goal in each school remains the same, that is, to gain knowledge and insight about a phenomenon.


Three major schools can be found, but there is overlap and linkage between them. The first is the Duquesne School, guided by Husserl’s ideas about eidetic structure (so called because its followers worked at one stage in time at Duquesne University). The second school is about the interpretation of phenomena (Heideggerian hermeneutics). The combination of both is found in the Dutch School of phenomenology.


The Duquesne School focuses mostly on the notion of description. Giorgi (1985) states that social scientists should describe what presents itself to them without adding or subtracting from it. His advice is to acknowledge the evidence and not go beyond the data although he believes that description cannot ever be complete. The ‘interpretation of phenomena’ approach concentrates on taken-for-granted practices and common meanings, whilst the Dutch School aims to combine both description and interpretation.


The phenomenological research process: doing phenomenology


Giorgi has always recognised the problem in applying a philosophical approach to a practice discipline. This means that new researchers are often uncertain of how to proceed when wishing to use phenomenological research. While developing ideas about complementarities of different phenomenological approaches as a philosophical basis for nursing research, Todres and Wheeler (2001: 2) discuss some philosophical distinctions in the approach to human experience that need to be included when carrying out practical research. They approach three areas in which they show that phenomenology, hermeneutics and existentialism have a contribution to make to health research: grounding, reflexivity and humanisation.


Grounding


Grounding means taking the lifeworld as a starting point. It includes the everyday world of common experiences. The lifeworld is more complex than that which can be said about it and contains inherent tensions. Lived experience for Husserl is the ground of inquiry. There is also a need for inquiry. The commonplace, taken for granted, becomes a phenomenon when it becomes questionable. The understanding of the lifeworld demands an open-minded attitude in which prior assumptions are bracketed so that descriptions can clarify meanings and relationships.


Reflexivity and positional knowledge


Hermeneutics has added certain dimensions to phenomenological research. Gadamer (1975) developed Heidegger’s ideas about interpretation as integral to human existence. Human beings are self-reflective persons who are based in everyday life. Their personal relationships and experience happen in a temporal and historical context and depend on their position in the world. Preconceptions and provisional knowledge are always revised in the light of experience and reflection. The text is always open to multiple interpretations because researchers or reflective persons are involved in their own relationships with the world and others.


Humanisation and the language of experience


Human beings cannot be separated from their relationships in the world. Heidegger’s notion of Dasein, being-in-the-world, entails a relationship between being human and being-in-the-world. Researchers search for fundamental and general categories of human existence that illuminate experiences that reveal a world. Heidegger (Todres and Wheeler, 2001: 5) reflects on fundamental structures that characterise the essential qualities of being-in-the-world such as



  • the way in which the body occurs;
  • the way the co-constituting of temporal structures occurs;
  • the way the meaningful word of place and things occurs;
  • the way the quality of interpersonal relationships occurs.

This is how Heidegger shows that body, time and space reflect the qualities of human presence rather than being notions of quantitative measurement.


From these ideas Todres and Wheeler (2001) conclude that phenomenology grounds research and stays away from theoretical abstraction. They also claim that hermeneutics adds the notion of reflexivity, which makes researchers ask questions meaningful and relevant in cultural, temporal and historical contexts. Lastly, these writers state that the ontological existential dimension humanises the research so it is not merely technical and utilitarian.


Phenomenological research focuses on the lifeworld, lived experiences which are described by the participants who reflect on them. These experiences might include ‘the experience of diabetes’, ‘being a first-time father’, ‘living with epilepsy’, and similar phenomena. From these experiences phenomenologists gain insight and extract common themes – essential structures or essences – which human beings have in common and that go beyond individual cases (Todres and Holloway, 2006). Thus, a phenomenological study presents the essential structure of a phenomenon. Here the concept of bracketing becomes useful for the researcher who, as said before, must exclude (bracket) prior assumptions gained through experience or literature to see the phenomenon with an open mind. It is, however, not sufficient to confirm that bracketing has occurred; the researcher also has to show how and where this took place. This is important for the early stages of the inquiry, while later on the researcher has a dialogue with the literature about the phenomenon that is being illuminated. Bracketing means that the researchers can experience things as fresh and new as they do not prejudge. Husserl uses the term epoché (from the Greek for cessation) to characterise this suspension of judgement or bracketing. This phenomenological reduction is necessary to gain the essence of a phenomenon.


Van Manen (1990: 5) outlines some of the important features that characterise phenomenological research.



  • Phenomenological research is the study of lived experience.
  • Phenomenological research is the explication of phenomena as they present themselves to consciousness.
  • Phenomenological research is the study of essences or meaning (depending on the specific approach).
  • Phenomenological research is the description of the experiential meanings we live as we live them.
  • Phenomenological research is the human scientific study of phenomena.
  • Phenomenological research is the attentive practice of thoughtfulness.
  • Phenomenological research is a search for what it means to be human.
  • Phenomenological research is a poetizing activity.

The latter means that reflexive writing and aesthetic presentation is an essential and integral element in phenomenological research. Indeed, it is crucial. Giorgi and Giorgi remind the researcher that phenomenological inquiry should stay as close as possible to the phenomenon to be illuminated. To begin the process of phenomenological inquiry, researchers obviously need an area of interest, puzzlement, concern or a gap in general or specific knowledge about a phenomenon. ‘Practising science’, as Giorgi (2000) calls it, is distinctly different from ‘doing philosophy’. Indeed he criticises researchers who write on nursing research, such as Crotty (1996) or Paley (1997) for not distinguishing between the two. Giorgi sees value in the use of phenomenological research in nursing but suggests that this means scientific work rather than doing philosophy. (Giorgi’s engagement with the ideas of Crotty and Paley is important but cannot be followed up here.)


In all approaches the researcher has a responsibility to justify the type of theoretical framework (e.g. symbolic interactionism, phenomenology or any other) and specify and outline the approach to data analysis (e.g. grounded theory for the former, or Colaizzi’s (1978) and other writers’ approaches as regards the latter). Holloway and Todres (2003) argue that there is a need to avoid ‘method-slurring’ and preserve the integrity of the approach. This is particularly important in phenomenology because of its distinctive underlying philosophy.


In data analysis for phenomenological inquiry, the researcher aims to uncover and produce a description of the lived experience. The procedural steps to achieve this aim vary with the approach taken by the researcher in terms of the three main types of phenomenology previously outlined. Various researchers have developed approaches to data analysis that follow the requirements of bracketing, intuition and reflection. One of these, Colaizzi (1978), outlined a seven-stage process of analysis. Although there has been criticism of pioneering work such as this (Hycner, 1985), this particular process of analysis for the eidetic approach of phenomenology is both logical and credible. Hycner (1985: 279) states, however, that ‘there is an appropriate reluctance on the part of phenomenologists to focus too much on specific steps in research methods for fear that they will become verified as they have in the natural sciences’. There are, however, several interpretations of the data analysis process depending on the school of phenomenology chosen. For example Streubert Speziale and Rinaldi Carpenter (2007: 83) outline the different procedural steps from other, earlier, authors, such as Van Kaam (1959), Paterson and Zderad (1976), Colaizzi (1978), Van Manen (1990) and Giorgi (1985).


Procedures for data collection and analysis


The data collection starts with the specific and proceeds to the general. For instance in their search for the description of a phenomenon, researchers attempt to ask for a concrete example of their everyday experience of this phenomenon within its context. For instance, a first-time father might be asked: ‘What was this experience like for you?’ A study of the phenomenon of backpain might start with the researcher’s question: ‘Describe a situation in which your backpain occurred.’ While asking these questions, the researcher brackets prior assumptions and presuppositions. During the rest of the interview the researcher will focus on clarifying the phenomenon. Many such interviews will uncover the essential structure or essence of the phenomenon which is common to all participants.


Many phenomenological research studies originate in the Duquesne School and use the approaches from one of the following authors, Colaizzi (1978), Giorgi (1985) or Van Kaam (1966). Although these authors are still popular – especially Giorgi – who made this his life’s work – other approaches, in particularly interpretive phenomenology, have also flourished, though analysis is often similar to that of the following authors. Colaizzi advocates seven steps, Giorgi four and Van Kaam six but many of these steps are similar or overlap, and they are never rigidly applied.


In selecting a school of phenomenology, the researcher will be guided by the approach to the most appropriate procedural steps in data analysis. For the purposes of this chapter, we outline and discuss those developed by Giorgi (1985, 2000) and Colaizzi (1978). It is, however, a decision for student and supervisor (novice or expert researcher) to select the approach best suited for the phenomenon under investigation and to utilise the appropriate literature to guide the research methodology and analysis.


Both Giorgi (1985, 2000, 2008) and Colaizzi (1978) argue for a descriptive approach and provide a method for data analysis, for instance from transcribed tapes of interviews with participants. These are just examples of qualitative data analyses.


Giorgi’s steps for analysis are as follows.


Feb 19, 2017 | Posted by in NURSING | Comments Off on Phenomenology

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