CHAPTER 2 Sonya R. Hardin and Sue Marquis Bishop “The study of paradigms…is what mainly prepares the student for membership in the particular scientific community with which he [she] will later practice (p. 11). In the absence of a paradigm…all the facts that could possibly pertain to the development of a given science are likely to seem equally relevant” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 15). Modern science was established over 400 years ago as an intellectual activity to formalize given phenomena of interest in an attempt to describe, explain, predict, or control states of affairs in nature. Scientific activity has persisted because it has improved quality of life and has satisfied human needs for creative work, a sense of order, and the desire to understand the unknown (Bronowski, 1979; Gale, 1979; Piaget, 1970). The development of nursing science has evolved since the 1960s as a pursuit to be understood as a scientific discipline. Because it is a scientific discipline, the unique contribution of nursing to the care of patients, families, and communities is acknowledged. To formalize the science of nursing, basic questions must be considered, such as “What is science, knowledge, and truth?” and “What methods produce scientific knowledge?” These are philosophical questions. The term epistemology is concerned with the theory of knowledge in philosophical inquiry. The particular philosophical perspective selected to answer these questions will influence how scientists perform scientific activities, how they interpret outcomes, and even what they regard as science and knowledge (Brown, 1977). Although philosophy has been documented as an activity for 3000 years, formal science is a relatively new human pursuit (Brown, 1977; Foucault, 1973). Scientific activity only recently has become the object of investigation. Two competing philosophical foundations of science, rationalism and empiricism, have evolved in the era of modern science with several variations. Gale (1979) labeled these alternative epistemologies as centrally concerned with the power of reason and the power of sensory experience. Gale noted similarities in the divergent views of science in the time of the classical Greeks. For example, Aristotle believed that advances in biological science would occur through systematic observation of objects and events in the natural world, whereas Pythagoras believed that knowledge of the natural world would result from mathematical reasoning (Brown, 1977; Gale, 1979). Rationalist epistemology (scope of knowledge) emphasizes the importance of a priori reasoning as the appropriate method for advancing knowledge. A priori reasoning utilizes deductive logic by reasoning from the cause of an effect or by generalizing to a particular instance. An example in nursing is to reason that appendicitis (cause) will result in pain (effect). The scientist in this tradition approaches the task of scientific inquiry by developing a systematic explanation (theory) of a given phenomenon (Gale, 1979). This conceptual system is analyzed by addressing the logical structure of the theory and the logical reasoning involved in its development. Theoretical assertions derived by deductive reasoning then are subjected to experimental testing to corroborate the theory. Reynolds (1971) labeled this approach the theory-then-research strategy. If research findings fail to correspond to the theoretical assertions, additional research is conducted, or modifications are made in the theory and additional tests are devised; otherwise, the theory is discarded in favor of an alternative explanation (Gale, 1979; Zetterberg, 1966). Popper (1962) argued that science would evolve more rapidly through the process of conjectures and refutations by devising research in an attempt to refute new ideas. For example, his point is simple: You can never prove that all individuals with appendicitis have pain because there might be one individual who presents with no pain. A single person with appendicitis who does not have pain disproves the theory that all individuals with appendicitis have pain. From Popper’s perspective, “research consists of generating general hypotheses and then attempting to refute them” (Lipton, 2005, p. 1263). The rationalist view is most clearly evident in the work of Einstein, the theoretical physicist, who made extensive use of mathematical equations in developing his theories. The theories that Einstein constructed offered an imaginative framework, which has directed research in numerous areas (Calder, 1979). As Reynolds (1971) noted, if someone believes that science is a process of inventing descriptions of phenomena, the appropriate strategy for theory construction is the theory-then-research strategy. In Reynolds’ view, “as the continuous interplay between theory construction (invention) and testing with empirical research progresses, the theory becomes more precise and complete as a description of nature and, therefore, more useful for the goals of science” (p. 145). The empiricist view is based on the central idea that scientific knowledge can be derived only from sensory experience. Francis Bacon (Gale, 1979) received credit for popularizing the basis for the empiricist approach to inquiry. Bacon believed that scientific truth was discovered through generalization of observed facts in the natural world. This approach, called the inductive method, is based on the idea that the collection of facts precedes attempts to formulate generalizations, or as Reynolds (1971) called it, the research-then-theory strategy. One of the best examples that can be used to demonstrate this form of logic in nursing has to do with formulating a differential diagnosis. Formulating a differential diagnosis requires collecting facts, then devising a list of possible theories to explain the facts. The strict empiricist view is reflected in the work of the behaviorist Skinner. In a 1950 paper, Skinner asserted that advances in the science of psychology could be expected if scientists would focus on the collection of empirical data. He cautioned against drawing premature inferences and proposed a moratorium on theory building until additional facts were collected. Skinner’s (1950) approach to theory construction was clearly inductive. His view of science and the popularity of behaviorism have been credited with influencing psychology’s shift in emphasis from the building of theories to the gathering of facts between the 1950s and 1970s (Snelbecker, 1974). The difficulty with the inductive mode of inquiry is that the world presents an infinite number of possible observations and, therefore, the scientist must bring ideas to her experiences to decide what to observe and what to exclude (Steiner, 1977). Although Skinner disclaimed to be developing a theory in his early writings, Bixenstine (1964) noted, “Skinner is startlingly creative in applying the conceptual elements of his, let’s be frank, theory to a wide variety of issues, ranging from training pigeons in the guidance of missiles, to developing teaching machines, to constructing a model society” (p. 465). During the first half of this century, philosophers focused on the analysis of theory structure, whereas scientists focused on empirical research (Brown, 1977). Minimal interest was seen in the history of science, the nature of scientific discovery, or the similarities between the philosophical view of science and the scientific methods (Brown, 1977). Positivism, a term first used by Comte, emerged as the dominant view of modern science (Gale, 1979). Modern logical positivists believed that empirical research and logical analysis were two approaches that would produce scientific knowledge. Logical positivists hailed the system of symbolic logic, published from 1910 to 1913 by Whitehead and Russell, as an appropriate approach to discovering truth (Brown, 1977). The logical empiricists offered a more lenient view of logical positivism and argued that theoretical propositions (a proposition affirms or denies something) must be tested through observation and experimentation Brown, 1977). This perspective is rooted in the idea that empirical facts exist independently of theories and offer the only basis for objectivity in science Brown, 1977). In this view, objective truth exists independently of the researcher, and the task of science is to discover it. The empiricist view shares similarities with Aristotle’s view of biological science and Bacon’s inductive method as the true method of scientific inquiry (Gale, 1979). This view of science often is presented in research method courses as the single orthodox view of the scientific enterprise, and it is taught in the following manner: “The scientist first sets up an experiment; observes what occurs … reaches a preliminary hypothesis to describe the occurrence; runs further experiments to test the hypothesis [and] finally corrects or modifies the hypothesis in light of the results” (Gale, 1979, p. 13). The increasing use of computers, which permit the analysis of large data sets, may have contributed to the acceptance of the positivist approach to modern science (Snelbecker, 1974). However, in the 1950s, the literature began to reflect an increasing challenge to the positivist view, thereby ushering in a new view of science Brown, 1977). In the latter years of the twentieth century, several authors presented analyses that challenged the positivist position, thus offering the basis for a new perspective on science (Brown, 1977; Foucault, 1973; Hanson, 1958;Kuhn, 1962; Toulmin, 1961). Foucault (1973) published his analysis (first published in French in 1966) of the epistemology (knowledge) of human sciences from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. His major thesis stated that empirical knowledge was arranged in different patterns at a given time and in a given culture. Over time, he found changes in the focus of inquiry in what was regarded by scholars as scientific knowledge and in how knowledge was organized. Further, he concluded that humans only recently emerged as objects of study. Schutz (1967), in his Phenomenology of the Social World, argued that scientists seeking to understand the social world could not cognitively know an external world that is independent of their own life experiences. Phenomenology as set forth by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) proposed that the objectivism of science precluded adequate apprehension of the world (Husserl, 1931, 1970). A phenomenological approach reduces observations or text to the meanings of phenomena, independent of their particular occasions. This approach typically focuses on the lived meaning of experiences. Empiricists view phenomena objectively, collect data, and analyze them to inductively propose a theory Brown, 1977). This form is based on the position that objective truth exists in the world, waiting to be discovered. Brown (1977) set forth a new epistemology to challenge the empiricist view, proposing that theories play a significant role in determining what the scientist observes and how it is interpreted. The following story, related to Marquis Bishop by her grandmother, illustrates Brown’s premise that observations are concept laden, that is, an observation is influenced by values and ideas in the mind of the observer: Brown (1977) presented the example of a chemist and a child walking together past a steel mill. The chemist perceived the odor of sulfur dioxide, and the child smelled rotten eggs. Both observers in the example responded to the same observation but with distinctly different interpretations. In studying family dynamics, students may analyze videotapes of family therapy sessions to learn different approaches to family situations. Novice students tend to focus on the content of family interaction (what one member says to another) or the behaviors of individual family members. After studying a system view of families focused on patterned transactions among family members, students recognize and describe transactions among family members that they did not perceive when first viewing the videotapes. For example, the son withdraws when his parents argue, or the wife grits her teeth when her husband speaks. Concepts and theories set up boundaries and specify pertinent phenomena for reasoning about specific patterns. For example, a social network concept may be more fruitful for studying social relations than the group concept in some instances, because it focuses attention on a more complex set of relationships that are beyond the boundaries of any one setting (Bishop, 1984; Irving, 1977). These examples represent different ideas that can emerge from each person. If scientists perceive patterns in the empirical world based on their pre-supposed theories, how can new patterns ever be perceived or new discoveries become formulated? Gale (1979) answered by proposing that the scientist is able to perceive forceful intrusions from the environment that challenge his or her a priori mental set, thereby introducing questions regarding the current theoretical perspective. Therefore, Brown (1977) maintained that a pre-supposed theoretical framework influences perception; however, theories are not the single determining factor of the scientist’s perception. Brown identified the following three different views of the relationship between theory and observation: 1. Scientists are merely passive observers of occurrences in the empirical world. Observable data consist of objective truth waiting to be discovered. 2. Theories structure what the scientist perceives in the empirical world. 3. Pre-supposed theories and observable data interact in the process of scientific investigation (Brown, 1977, p. 298).
History and Philosophy of Science
HISTORICAL VIEWS OF THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
Rationalism
Empiricism
EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY VIEWS OF SCIENCE AND THEORY
EMERGENT VIEWS OF SCIENCE AND THEORY IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY
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